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There  is  a  broad  theoretical  end  empirical  economic  literature  discussing  the  effects  of 
termination charges on competition and retail prices. Most of this literature has focused on the 
telecommunications markets. Termination charges in the international parcel market have not 
yet received much attention in the economic literature. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap 
and to analyze the economics of termination charges for parcels. We find that the economics 
of termination charges in the international parcel market are different to termination charges 
in other markets. 
To assess the economics of termination charges in the international parcel market this paper 
takes three steps. First, a basic outline of the current structure of international parcel markets 
is  presented  and  existing  international  termination  systems  are  explained.  Second,  the 
literature on termination charges in the telecommunication market is shortly summarized and 
the crucial differences of the international parcel market to telecommunication markets are 
elaborated.  Third,  two  game  theoretic  models  are  constructed  to  assess  the  economics  of 
termination charges. It is found that postal operators are in a “prisoner’s dilemma” where 
bilateral bargaining processes are likely to result in a suboptimal situation with excessive 
pricing and underinvestment in quality. When accounting for quality, termination charges in 
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JEL classification 
D40; F19; L50; L90    1.  The international parcel market
1 
The parcel segment is one of the most liberalized segments in the postal industry. A recent 
market survey commissioned by the EC
2 has revealed that 30 out of 31 European incumbents 
perceived  competition  within  the  parcel  segment  as  “intense”.  In  the  parcels  market, 
incumbents are typically referred to as “designated operators” (DOs) in that they have been 
designated by their home country to fulfill the country’s international obligations stemming 
from  the  Universal  Postal  Union  (UPU).  These  obligations  include  the  termination  of 
international inbound parcels sent by other DOs according to the UPU’s remuneration system 
referred to as “inward land rates” (ILR). 
Besides the DOs, the main market players competing in the international parcels market are 
integrators. Integrators are international companies that provide integrated services between 
countries,  i.e.  operating  in  the  country  of  origin  and  destination  under  the  same  brand. 
Examples include DHL, FedEx, UPS and TNT. Competition for an international parcel takes 
place in the country of origin between a DO and integrated operators. Generally, DOs do not 
compete  against  each  other  because  sending  a  parcel  to  country  A  is  not  a  substitute  to 
sending  a  parcel  to  country  B  and  DOs  operate  in  their  domestic  market  exclusively 
(exemptions are selected integrators that are dominated by a DO, such as DHL or DPD). 
Hence,  the  international  parcel  market  consists  of  separated  but  interconnected  domestic 
parcel markets. 
The international parcel market is a constantly growing market. Its growth is according to 
UPU (2010) mainly driven by international trade and retail prices seem to matter for the 
allocation of market shares mainly, not for determining overall volumes. From 1998 to 2008, 
worldwide  express  and  light-weight  parcel  volumes  have  grown  by  51.8%;  revenues  by 
90.0%.
3 In this growing market DOs have been constantly loosing market shares as Figure 1 
shows. 
 
Figure 1: Volume and Revenue Share Development in the E&PS market 
 
Source: Trinkner et al. (2011)  
 
Hence, DOs are either losing their competitiveness compared to the other suppliers in the 
E&PS market (e.g. in terms of prices or services) or they are not enough involved in the 
growing segments of the E&PS market. 
                                                           
1   This paper is based on Trinkner et al. (2011) 
2   Okholm et al. (2010). 
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(right scale)The  parcels  market  can  be  divided  into  four  main  sender-receiver  segments:  business-to-
business (B2B), business-to-consumer (B2C), consumer-to-business (C2B), and customer-to-
customer (C2C). These segments vary by operating costs, barriers to entry, customers’ needs, 
growth rates, and profit margins. 
Figure  2  depicts  the  segmentation  of  the  European  Parcel  Market  and  the  approximated 
market shares of parcels billed under the ILR system in each segment. We observe a rather 
weak position of the ILR system in the two largest and most dynamic segments, B2B and 
B2C. In Section 4 we aim to explain this competitive position of the  ILR system with a 
stylized game theoretic model of the international parcel market. The extended version of the 
model incorporates quality to account for studies on consumer’s preferences indicating that 
quality of service is a crucial issue in the international parcel market.
4  
Figure 2: Market share of parcels billed under UPU ILR termination system 
 
Source: Trinkner et al. (2011) 
2.  International termination charge systems 
In the cross border parcel market, non integrated operators need to buy the service of end 
delivery in the country of destination from an operator. There are several systems to price 
such  an  access  to  service/network.  This  section  presents  the  most  important  termination 
charge systems in the parcel market. 
The ILR system is a termination charge system lead by the UPU. It is decided by its 191 UPU 
member states in a democratic procedure. All DOs of the member countries can send their 
international  parcels  in  this  pricing  regime.  It  is  hence  a  global,  multilateral  termination 
charge system. The ILR pricing system is twofold: The total termination charge is composed 
of a base rate and a bonus which rewards the supply of defined services with a markup on the 
base rate.  
The base rate is either  
A. calculated as 71.4% of a country’s ILR taken at 2004 levels (plus any inflation-linked 
adjustment) or 
B. set to the “global minimum base rate” at 2.85 SDR per parcel plus 0.28 SDR per kg.  
Under this calculation the global minimum base rate B applies only if A is smaller than B. 
Otherwise the ILR equals A (UPU 2011). Until 2004 ILRs were set by each DO unilaterally. 
Hence, the ILR system may be referred to as a “decentralized market solution” as introduced 
in Section 4. 
                                                           
4   For an overview, cf. Trinkner et al. (2011). It is stated that on-time performance, end-to-end speed, reliability, and tracking information 
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DO Surface ParcelsNext to the UPU ILR there are other termination systems such as E-Parcel Group (EPG) and 
the  Kahala  Posts  Group  (KPG).  In  addition,  DOs  can  buy  termination  services  from 
integrators. The pricing of these alternatives to the ILR is not disclosed. 
3.  Access charges in the literature 
As elaborated in Section 1, access in the international parcel market is about two-way access 
in separated but interconnected markets. Therefore, the one-way access charge literature is not 
of relevance for the international parcel market and we focus on the literature on two-way 
access.  The  literature  on  two-way  access  is  focused  on  the  national  telecommunications 
market.  The  national  telecommunication  market  is  different  from  the  international  parcel 
market in the following aspects: 
i.  In the national telecommunication market operators, which seek access to each other’s 
networks, are competing for the same consumers. In the international parcel market, 
operators do not compete for the same market and hence not against each other.  
ii.  Competition in the telecommunications market is often in multipart tariffs, while in 
the postal sector, tariffs are linear.  
iii.  An operator in the international parcel market faces many different operators (up to 
about  200)  with  whom  he  needs  to  connect.  In  the  national  telecommunication 
markets  there  are  only  a  handful  of  operators  to  connect  with,  i.e.  bilateral 
negotiations are less costly.  
iv.  Characteristics of the network: Telecommunication networks consist to an important 
extent  of  physical  and  durable  items  (lines  and  transmitters).  Adjusting  a 
telecommunication network therefore takes time, the new lines or transmitters have to 
be built, and causes sunk costs. The relevant part of the network in the international 
parcel market, the delivery, is the route the postman drives. Hence, the parcel network 
cannot be considered physical or durable. Routes are adjusted on a daily basis. Costs 
are mainly variable or fix, but almost never sunk.   
v.  Characteristics of the goods: From a technical point of view, terminating any phone 
call  is  simply  a  transmission  of  binary  data  in  the  existing  network.  Hence,  the 
termination of a phone call can be viewed as a homogenous process. The termination 
of a parcel service is a more heterogeneous process as not all parcels have the same 
form, seize or weight. For the termination of a specific parcel, the network has to be 
adjusted.  Similarly,  quality  ranges  considerably  among  the  various  operators  (for 
example, some DOs have no home delivery service while others have).   
These differences make several issues discussed in the literature on two way access irrelevant 
for the international parcel market. The first point (i) implies that in the international parcel 
market predatory access charge pricing or access charges as an instrument of tacit collusion as 
mentioned by Armstrong (1998), Laffont et al. (1998) and Carter & Wright (1999) will not be 
of  concern.  (ii) puts  the  validity  of  results  derived  in  multipart  tariffs  into  question. The 
efficiency of bilateral negotiations of access charges, which is the benchmark in the national 
telecommunication  market,  is  challenged  by  (iii).  (iv)  implies  that  investment  incentives 
matter in the international parcel market already in the short run and not only in the long run 
as in the telecommunication market. According to (v) “characteristics“ (quality) of parcel 
services  are  adjustable.  Hence,  quality  may  be  an  important  additional  dimension  in  the 
determination of parcel termination charges.  
Despite of these differences, some results from the two way access literature may still apply 
to the international parcel market. The point of reference for the two way access literature is 
Laffont et al. (1998). They find that in noncompeting networks, which is also the case in the 
international parcel market, the noncooperative two-stage game in access charges and retail prices leads to double marginalization. Laffont et al. (1998) additionally derive that for small 
substitutability between the two networks the access charge which maximizes joint profits of 
the  two  operators  decreases  to  the  marginal  costs.  Together,  this  implies  that  integrators 
would set their (virtual) access charges equal to marginal costs whereas the noncooperative 
determination of access charges between two DOs in the international parcel market cannot be 
expected to be efficient due to the double marginalization. However, Laffont et al. (1998) do 
not provide any solution to the problem of double marginalization in noncompeting networks 
and their results are derived under the assumption of balanced calling patterns, i.e. symmetric 
operators. This assumption of symmetry does not hold in the international parcel market.  
Carter and Wright (2003) find in a model of competing networks allowing for asymmetries a 
particularly  simple,  optimal  regulation:  If  carriers  cannot  agree  on  the  terms  of 
interconnection, the larger carrier is entitled to select the access price which is then applied 
reciprocally. 
4.  Modelling international parcel termination 
In the following we first leave quality issues mentioned above aside and assess whether or not 
the most striking results from the literature on national termination charges may also apply for 
the international parcel market. Quality is introduced in Section 4.2. 
4.1  Base model 
The ineffectiveness of noncooperative access prices in noncompeting networks mentioned by 
Laffont  et  al.  (1998)  as  well  as  Laffont  and  Tirole  (2000,  page  184)  also  applies  to  the 
international parcel market as the following simple game theoretic model will show. The 
model  in  Annex  1  proves  the  ineffectiveness  of  decentralized  access  charges  in  the 
international parcel market in a more general setting. 
We model the international parcel business between two countries A and B in the most simple 
way. The profit function of a designated operator ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  is assumed to be: 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 
where ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿.  pi stands for the retail price of DO i for an outbound 
parcel and ￿￿ is the retail price of the other DO j for an outbound parcel (which is an inbound 
parcel for DO i). ￿￿
￿ is the constant marginal cost per outbound parcel and ￿￿
￿ is the constant 
marginal cost of an inbound parcel for operator i.  aj stands for the termination charge which 
has to be paid by operator i to the foreign operator j for the delivery of a parcel. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
represents the domestic demand for international parcels, which depends on the price of the 
domestic operator ￿￿ as well as on the price ￿￿￿ of an integrated competitor. ￿￿ represents an 
amount of fix cost. 
Hence, the first term of the profit function represents the revenues from outgoing parcels, i.e. 
net revenue per parcel multiplied by the domestic demand ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. The second term stands 
for  the  revenue  of  incoming  parcels,  i.e.  the  termination  charge  minus  marginal  costs 
multiplied by the demand for international parcels in country j. 
Following Dietl et al. (2005) and Jaag and Trinkner (2011) a quasi-linear utility function is 
assumed 
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￿ ($￿￿￿￿￿ where  ￿)￿￿*￿  $ + ,  and  ( ￿ ￿,￿-￿.  A  smaller  parameter  (￿indicates  a  higher  degree  of 
differentiation. The parameters ￿) and ￿ ''') determine the market shares of the designated 
operator i and the integrated operator, respectively, whereas $ determines the slope of the 
demand function. We assume that the parameter constellation is such that the point of local 
satiation is not reached. 
 




￿#￿ ￿ (# '￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿￿￿￿ 
An  operator  therefore  has  two  strategic  instruments  to  maximize  its profit:  The price  for 
international  parcels  and  the  termination  charge.  We  assume  that the  strategic  interaction 
between the two designated operators is of the nature of a two stage game. First they set their 
termination charges and then given these charges they decide which price to charge. Hence 
the game is solved backwards to attain a subgame-perfect nash equilibrium. 
Decentralized market equilibrium 
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Anticipating the best response of the opponent country j in stage two of the game yields the 
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Competition in first stage, i.e. insert 0 '*depending on fundamental market parameters.  
Industry Optimum: 
If the two countries collude and maximize the joint industry profit  
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These prices imply that the optimal termination charge in the industry optimum is equal to the 
inbound marginal cost, i.e. 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ 
It can be shown that operators are strictly worse off with the outcome in the decentralized 
market compared to the industry optimum for any market constellations, i.e. 
 
￿123 + ￿￿3 ￿ ￿￿3 
This  result  can  be  explained  by  the  issue  of  double  marginalization  in  the  decentralized 
market equilibrium which is avoided in the industry optimum. These  results  rely  on  the  assumption  that  the  operators  strictly  maximize  profits  and 
termination  charges  are  not  regulated.  These  are  critical  assumptions  because  designated 
operators often are regulated and cannot choose their prices freely. If the retail parcel prices of 
the foreign DO are capped (price-cap regulation), then in the decentralized market solution 
the terminating operator would aim to set infinitely high termination charges as the retail price 
of the foreign DO, and hence demand, is not affected by the level of the termination charges 
(due to the cap).  
Further, it is assumed here that designated operators do not have an alternative to cooperating 
with the foreign designated operator to deliver a parcel in a foreign country. In reality, of 
course, designated operators can cooperate with integrated operators.  But abandoning this 
assumption does not change the previous result of excessively high termination charges in the 
decentralized  market  equilibrium  it  only  implements  an  upper  bound  for  the  level  of 
termination charges.  
Social optimum  
The optimal termination charge from a welfare point of view depends on the definition of 
welfare. If one wants to maximize the welfare of a single country, i.e. maximize the sum of 
domestic profits and consumer surplus, a high access charge for incoming parcels and a low 
(probably  below  marginal  costs)  access  charge  for  outgoing  parcels  are  optimal  for  this 
specific  country.  The  high  access  charge  on  incoming  parcels  maximizes  profits  of  the 
domestic operator without inducing any distortions to the domestic market. The distortions 
from the high access charge take place in the foreign market which the national social planner 
does not care about. The access charge on outgoing parcels is from a national social planner’s 
point  of  view  optimally  very  low  as  this  access  charge  can  be  used  as  an  instrument  to 
intensify competition and therefore maximize consumer surplus. This access charge might 
optimally be below marginal costs as it might be used to correct market imperfections. 
If we define welfare from a global perspective, i.e. the sum of all profits and all consumer 
surpluses, the optimal access charge is equal to the marginal costs. In the global setting the 
access charge is not a valid instrument to correct national market imperfections and hence 
access charges below marginal costs are not an option for corrective market interventions. 
Only  if  there  existed  some  form  of  global  externalities  in  the  parcel  market  termination 
charges different from marginal costs would be justified. Following Armstrong (2002) such 
an externality could be that the receivers derive a benefit from parcels and not only the sender. 
Then,  the  optimal  termination  charge  should  be  set  below  marginal  costs  in  order  to 
encourage senders to demand more parcel services. 
In this paper we do not assume the existence of such externalities and find that the socially 
optimal  termination  charge  is  equal  to  the  marginal  costs  and  hence  coincides  with  the 
optimal termination charge from an industry point of view. 
With balanced parcel streams between two countries this first best solution is realizable as 
operators  can  cover  the  fix  costs  of  the  inbound  service  with  the  profits  from  outbound 
parcels. But with asymmetric streams this first best result may not be implementable anymore 
as then the net importing operator may not generate enough revenues from outbound parcels 
to cover  fix costs of inbound services. Hence,  a lump sum transfer system is needed for 
asymmetric situations. But such a transfer system between different operators from different 
countries seems rather unrealistic and the second best solution therefore is the lowest possible 
access charge which still covers fix costs, i.e. access charges are set equal to average costs. 
Intuition of the result 
Intuitively,  setting  termination  charges  in  noncompeting  networks  can be  interpreted as a 
prisoner’s  dilemma.  The  dominant  strategy  is  to  set  excessively  high  termination  charges (above  marginal  costs)  which  leads  to  a  socially  undesirable  situation  of  dou
marginalization, i.e. not only consumers are worse off with the decentralized market solution 
but also operators. 
Figure 3: Prisoner’s Dilemma
 
Due  to  the  character  of  a  prisoner’s  dilemma  we  cannot  expect  designated  operators  to
voluntarily collaborate in the one shot game. If the game is played repeatedly, infinitely many 
times collusion might be sustained by the reasoning of Friedman (1971). However, even if the 
game is played ad infinitum collaboration, i.e. low access charges
an operator can collaborate with an integrator and therefore the “punishment” for deviating 
from setting low charges is weakened.
Another solution to this dilemma would be regulation by a third party. Optimally, this third 
party  would  set  the  termination  charge  equal  to  the  marginal  cost.  But  this  raises  two 
problems.  First,  this  would  require  a  third  party  which  has  the  legal  power  to  regulate 
termination  charges  in  the  international parcel  market.  Such  an  institution  does  not  ex
Second, marginal cost is private information of the operators and they may not be willing to 
reveal this information. 
In case of very unbalanced parcel streams setting termination charges might not be considered 
a  prisoner’s  dilemma.  An  operator  with 
outbound parcels (net importer) can always be better off with high access charges independent 
of  the  access  charge  of  the  other  operators.  Letting  operators  set  their  access  charges 
unilaterally remains a dilemma from an industry and welfare point of view but the solution of 
this dilemma becomes even trickier. The collusion (setting low charges) of the operators in 
case  of  an  infinitely  repeated  game  is  not  an  option  anymore  and  we  can  expect  strong 
opposition to a regulated access charge system with low rates from net importing operators. 
The  regulation  policy  in  the  telecommunication  market  of  reciprocal  termination  charges 
might  solve  this  dilemma.  Therefore,  we  turn  to  reciprocal  termination  charges  in  the 
following. 
Reciprocal termination charges
When designated operators are only allowed to set reciprocal termination charges, they face 
the following profit function 
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 If the operators have the same cost 
identical, it follows immediately that the chosen reciprocal termination charge is equal to the 
inbound  marginal  cost.  Hence,  for  identical  markets  and  operators,  reciprocal  termination 
charges provide an efficient solution. 
Reducing the choices to either high or low access charges as in the argumentation of the 
prisoner’s  dilemma  above  delivers  the  intuition  for  this  result.  Allowing  only  reciprocal 
access charges reduces the set of choice in 
setting either low access charges and having good profits or setting high access charges and 
receiving low profits in case of balanced parcel streams. In case of unbalanced parcel streams 
the game takes on the form illustrated in Figure 
access charges whereas the net exporter would like to have low access charges. The two 
operators will not agree on the efficient solution.
Figure 4: Reciprocal access c
 
Another point of view is that reciprocal termination charges aim to internalize the impact of 
the  chosen  termination  charge  on  the  profits  of  the  foreign  operator  to  avoid  the  double 
marginalization. If the termination charge similarly impacts the profits of both operators it is 
more likely that they act like an integrator, i.e. set termination charges equal to marginal costs. 
The termination charge will impact the profits of two operators in a similar way if they 
the same form of competition and have the same market position which in turn implies that 
the parcel streams are balanced.
Therefore, the two conditions for efficiency of reciprocal access charges stated above are to 
understand as conditions on the ba
In the international parcels market, it is very unlikely that all parcel streams between any two 
operators are balanced. Carter and Wright (2003) argue that for asymmetric structures the 
socially efficient termination charges can b
letting  the  larger  operator  choose  the  termination  charge  and  then  applying  this  charge 
reciprocally. This does not necessarily apply to the international parcels market.
Assuming  ,   and all other variables equal for the two operators implies that 
operator i is larger in terms of outbound parcels than operator 
and Wright (2003) would suggest that operator 
charge. The resulting termination charge then might lie below marginal costs. In this case the 
smaller operator j will incur negative profits and hence not participate in the international 
parcel market with operator i
charges might not have many participants.
4.2  Extended Model: Quality
As outlined in Section 2, quality is an important factor in the parcel market from the consumer 
point of view and hence from an industry and welfare point of view as well. 
If the operators have the same cost structure, i.e.  , and their market structures are 
identical, it follows immediately that the chosen reciprocal termination charge is equal to the 
inbound  marginal  cost.  Hence,  for  identical  markets  and  operators,  reciprocal  termination 
provide an efficient solution.  
Reducing the choices to either high or low access charges as in the argumentation of the 
prisoner’s  dilemma  above  delivers  the  intuition  for  this  result.  Allowing  only  reciprocal 
access charges reduces the set of choice in the game described in Figure 
setting either low access charges and having good profits or setting high access charges and 
receiving low profits in case of balanced parcel streams. In case of unbalanced parcel streams 
e form illustrated in Figure 4 and the net importer would prefer high 
access charges whereas the net exporter would like to have low access charges. The two 
operators will not agree on the efficient solution. 
charge with asymmetric streams 
 
Another point of view is that reciprocal termination charges aim to internalize the impact of 
the  chosen  termination  charge  on  the  profits  of  the  foreign  operator  to  avoid  the  double 
ation charge similarly impacts the profits of both operators it is 
more likely that they act like an integrator, i.e. set termination charges equal to marginal costs. 
The termination charge will impact the profits of two operators in a similar way if they 
the same form of competition and have the same market position which in turn implies that 
the parcel streams are balanced. 
Therefore, the two conditions for efficiency of reciprocal access charges stated above are to 
understand as conditions on the balance of parcel streams. 
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socially efficient termination charges can be attained in the telecommunication market by 
letting  the  larger  operator  choose  the  termination  charge  and  then  applying  this  charge 
reciprocally. This does not necessarily apply to the international parcels market.
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ation charge similarly impacts the profits of both operators it is 
more likely that they act like an integrator, i.e. set termination charges equal to marginal costs. 
The termination charge will impact the profits of two operators in a similar way if they face 
the same form of competition and have the same market position which in turn implies that 
Therefore, the two conditions for efficiency of reciprocal access charges stated above are to 
In the international parcels market, it is very unlikely that all parcel streams between any two 
operators are balanced. Carter and Wright (2003) argue that for asymmetric structures the 
e attained in the telecommunication market by 
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and all other variables equal for the two operators implies that 
. Then, the approach of Carter 
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quality is an important factor in the parcel market from the consumer 
point of view and hence from an industry and welfare point of view as well. So far we have abstracted from quality, in this 
for  quality.  Quality  is  closely  linked  to  investments  in  network  industries.  The  trade
between competition, regulation and incentives for in
This  trade-off  becomes  particularly  important  in  network  industries  with  access 
operators to the network (Valletti, 2003). 
The  literature  on  termination  charges  hardly  deals  with  the  effects  of  access  charges
investment incentives as most these analysis take place in a static framework and investment 
only matters in a dynamic context (at least in the telecommunication market) as Gans and 
Williams (1998) and Valletti (2003) point out. However, investment int
in the international parcel market even in the short run. In the parcel market the network (and 
especially its quality attributions) is built daily. The decisive quality attributions in the parcel 
market are the reliability and on
can be adjusted in the short run by an operator. Hence investment /quality issues arise already 
in a static framework. Of course, long run investments play a crucial role in the parcel market 
as well but these issues will be addressed later on.
Accounting  for  short  run  quality  considerations  makes  setting  termination  charges  in  the 
international parcel market a two stage game which is depicted in Figure 
the operators choose their access charge
operators determine their prices and inbound quality levels.
Figure 5: Game tree extended 
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consumers. Therefore, we get the following general profit function of a DO
and for an integrator (operating in market 
 
where   are the variable costs arising by short run quality investments 
notation is equivalent to Section 
There is no reason to expect the decentralized market equilibrium to be efficient as
of  double  marginalization  still  occurs  when  quality  is  included,  as  shown  in  Annex  1. 
Intuitively,  quality  induces  an  additional  free  rider  problem.  If  operator 
inbound quality  , operator j
access charge does not account for quality investments. Hence, operator 
benefits of its investment into quality and will ther
not factor in the dimension quality. This is analytically shown in Annex 2. 
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between competition, regulation and incentives for investment is fundamental in economics. 
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in the international parcel market even in the short run. In the parcel market the network (and 
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market are the reliability and on-time performance according to Section 2
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It is assumed that only the quality of service by the operator of destination matters for the 
consumers. Therefore, we get the following general profit function of a DO
ntegrator (operating in market i and j) 
are the variable costs arising by short run quality investments 
notation is equivalent to Section 4.1. 
is no reason to expect the decentralized market equilibrium to be efficient as
double  marginalization  still  occurs  when  quality  is  included,  as  shown  in  Annex  1. 
Intuitively,  quality  induces  an  additional  free  rider  problem.  If  operator 
j can increase its price without any additional costs given the 
access charge does not account for quality investments. Hence, operator 
benefits of its investment into quality and will therefore under invest if the access charge does 
not factor in the dimension quality. This is analytically shown in Annex 2.  
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destination matters for the 
consumers. Therefore, we get the following general profit function of a DO 
 
 
are the variable costs arising by short run quality investments  . The rest of the 
is no reason to expect the decentralized market equilibrium to be efficient as the issue 
double  marginalization  still  occurs  when  quality  is  included,  as  shown  in  Annex  1. 
Intuitively,  quality  induces  an  additional  free  rider  problem.  If  operator  i  invests  into  its 
can increase its price without any additional costs given the 
access charge does not account for quality investments. Hence, operator i cannot reap all 
efore under invest if the access charge does 
 The need for regulation of termination charges therefore remains. But what is the optimal 
termination charge with short run quality? It is straightforward to show that with quality the 
optimal termination charge is to be set above marginal costs.  
By our assumption of no externalities in the parcel market and our definition of welfare as a 
global concept the integrator will choose the socially optimal price-quality mix. Hence, the 
optimal  access  charge  makes  DOs  act  like  an  integrator,  as  already  argued  in  the  model 
without quality. Given that the access charge is an exogenous variable determined by some 
regulator or pricing system DOs can optimize profits over their price and offered inbound 
quality. Therefore, DOs face the following FOCs 
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By corresponding integrator we mean the DO and the corresponding integrator have the same 
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, can be reduced to 
￿￿
6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ 
Hence, the optimal access charge ￿￿
6 in terms of investment incentives allocates the total net 
revenue of a parcel to the operator of destination. As by assumption, only the investment into 
quality of the operator of destination matters and all costs of the investment are paid by the 
operator,  the  DO  of  destination  needs  to  receive  all  benefits  of  the  investment.  As  a 
consequence, an operator does not earn any profits with its outbound parcels but makes all his 
profits with its inbound parcels. 
From the demand function ￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿7 '￿￿ we know that the price ￿￿ depends on the offered 
quality￿7￿, i.e. ￿￿￿7￿￿, and as a consequence the optimal access charge ￿￿
6￿7￿￿ has to account 
for quality as well. The exact way how the access charge should account for quality depends 
on  how  demand  interacts  with  upstream  and  downstream  quality.  Upstream  quality  is  of 
importance as well. As a consequence, some revenue will need to be attributed to the DO of origin.  To  fully  cover  this  topic,  the  model would need  an  extension to  reflect  upstream 
quality that is determined by the DO of origin. These issues are beyond the scope of this 
paper. The share of revenue allocated to the DO of origin and destination will then depend on 
the relative importance of price versus upstream and downstream quality. We expect that such 
an extended framework will result in optimal termination charges above marginal costs with a 
markup reflecting downstream quality.  
The result that it is necessary to shift the entire margin to the downstream operator to create 
the efficient investment incentives indicates that it may be a challenge to find conditions 
under which access prices are able to induce the optimal investment behavior of an integrated 
firm (ensuring profit maximizing prices while investing optimally into quality both up- and 
downstream). Related literature on the investment incentives in vertically structured network 
industries reveals that is generally difficult to provide optimal up- or downstream investment 
incentives in vertically separated entities relative to integrated operators.
5 Hence, it will be an 
even greater challenge to provide adequate incentives up- and downstream at the same time. 
Furthermore,  an  access  charge  above  marginal  costs  contradicts  the  “non-double 






￿E ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿. 
Therefore, the optimal access charge seems not to exist. There is a trade-off between optimal 
investment incentives and avoidance of double marginalization when only allowing linear 
access charges. Following Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) one possible solution could be a 
non-linear access charge, which might be implementable as a decentralized solution. This 
promising approach is topic of our current research. 
5.  Conclusions 
Theory  predicts  that  letting  operators  set  their  international  access  prices  (termination 
charges) unilaterally leads to a socially undesirable situation of double marginalization (base 
model) and underinvestment (quality model).  
In our base model of international parcel markets where we do not account for quality, the 
first best access charge is equal to inbound marginal cost. This result fits into the existing 
access  charge  literature.  Our  analysis  reveals  that  this  first  best  solution  is  rather  not 
implementable  in  practice  as  there  is  no  powerful  (benevolent)  regulator  in  place,  and 
decentralized  solutions  such  as  reciprocal  access  charge  will  not  always  work  due  to 
asymmetric parcel flows. The second best solution in our base model would be to set access 
charges equal to average cost.  
In our quality model we show that the access charge is optimally set above marginal costs to 
align benefits and costs of quality investments. Termination systems that do not appropriately 
reward  for  quality  will  lead  to  a  situation  with  underinvestment  and  suboptimal  quality. 
Assuming that only  downstream quality is of  relevance to consumers, the optimal  access 
charge would even imply that an operator does not earn any profits with its outbound parcels 
but makes all his profits with its inbound parcels. The DO of destination would then optimally 
invest in quality as it would fully participate in the additional returns caused by its investment. 
It can be expected however that upstream quality is of importance to consumers as well. As a 
consequence, optimal termination charges are likely to ensure a markup on marginal costs for 
both operators. But this mark-up on marginal costs implies again double marginalization. 
Therefore, one can conclude that the first best outcome is not achievable through a simple 
                                                           
5 E.g. Buehler et al. (2004, 2006), Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) and Chen and Sappington (2009). access charge. Further research will be necessary to determine the optimal, probably non-
linear, access charge.  
The identified inefficiencies of the decentralized market equilibrium may explain the steadily 
decreasing market shares of DOs operating under the UPU ILR system and the existence of 
alternative pricing systems introduced by some DOs aiming to remain competitive in the 
international parcel market.  
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   Annex 1: Double Marginalization: The General Case 
We assume the following general demand function 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F￿￿￿4 5￿FG 5￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F￿￿￿G 5￿F4 5￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿￿6￿￿ ￿ 9￿￿￿￿6￿￿ ￿ ￿ 
where F captures all parameters which next to the price also might affect the demand, like e.g 
inbound quality. The rest of the notation is equivalent to Section 4.1. The usual assumptions 
on the demand and costs are assumed to hold such that the equilibrium exists, is unique and 
stable. We do not want to go into details of existence, stability and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium as these are fairly technical points, which do not deliver any additional insights 
and a similar model has already been outlined by Laffont and Tirole (1998) dealing with these 
technical issues. 
As setting termination charges is a two stage game, as depicted in Figure 5, we know that the 
parameter choices of DO j will depend on the access charge ￿￿ of DO i. Hence in the first 


















, and 9′￿6￿ ￿
;I>￿￿<￿H>￿￿
;H>






Hence, the access charge is set according to the well known Lerner mark-up rule. In the 
second stage there also is a mark-up over marginal costs. As access charges are part of the 
marginal costs of the second stage we will always have double marginalization in the 
decentralized international parcel market equilibrium. Analytically, in the second stage DO 






































M which proves the claim of the general presence of double marginalization in the decentralized 
equilibrium in the international parcel market. 
Annex 2: Underinvestment in Quality 
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the equilibrium implies  
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O N ,￿ABC￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿. Taking the FOCs of Section 4.4 and our 
assumption of the DO and its corresponding integrator having the same demand and costs 
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  can be reduced to 
￿￿￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 
The first best access charge which does not account for quality is equal to the marginal costs 
as derived in Section 4.1. Hence, by the assumption of the symmetry of DO and integrator the 
underinvestment condition becomes  
￿￿￿ + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 
This will always hold in equilibrium as this is a necessary condition for optimality, i.e. ￿ '￿ P
,. Hence, the first best access charge in static telecommunications market models applied to 
the international parcel market leads to underinvestment into quality. 